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COMES A TIME: THE CASE FOR RECORDING
INTERROGATIONS
Daniel Donovan* and John Rhodes**

The fundamental value that the privilege [against selfincrimination] reflects is intangible, it is true, but so is liberty,
and so is man's immortal soul. A man may be punished, even put
to death, by the state; but ... he should not be made to prostrate
himself before its majesty. Mea culpa belongs to a man and his
God. It is a plea that cannot be exacted from free men by human
authority. To require it is to insist that the state is the superior of
the individuals who compose it, instead of their instrument. 1

Throughout the 20th Century, law enforcement, prosecutors
and the courts have embraced technological developments to
investigate and prosecute crime. From wire-taps 2 to drug
sniffing dogs,3 courts have ruled that investigative techniques
pass constitutional muster.
Government and the courts,
however, have resisted utilizing technology to preserve and
promote constitutional rights. Repeatedly, at the urging of the
prosecution, courts have refused to require that defendant
statements be recorded to admit the statements at trial. 4 Yet,
where law enforcement records such statements, the courts have
5
readily admitted the recordings at the prosecution's request.
Thus far, only two American jurisdictions require defendant
*

Senior Assistant Federal Defender of Montana; B.S., University of California,

Berkeley; J.D. University of California, Hastings College of Law.
** Assistant Federal Defender of Montana; BA. DePauw University;, J.D. Harvard Law

School.
1. Abe Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25 CLEv.
B. ASS'N J. 91, 99-100 (1954).
2. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 468 (1928) (holding that
wiretapping was permitted by Federal Constitution), overruled in part by Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
3. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that a dog sniff

was not a search).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Coades, 549 F.2d 1303, 1305 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding
that recording was not required for admission of statement); State v. Grey, 274 Mont.
206, 214, 907 P.2d 951, 956 (1995) (refusing to adopt a recording requirement; however,
the absence of a recording, where recording is feasible, will be viewed with distrust in
the assessment of the voluntariness of the statement). See also infra note 52.
5. See Diane M. Allen, Annotation, Admissibility of Visual Recording of Event or
Matter Other Than That Giving Rise to Litigation or Prosecution,41 A.L.R.4th 877, § 10
(1985); State v. Brubaker, 184 Mont. 294, 301, 602 P.2d 974, 978 (1979) (holding that
tape-recorded statement of defendant's interview could be played for jury since
interviewing detective could have testified regarding statements made by defendant).
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statements to be recorded in order to admit the statements. 6
The Supreme Court of Montana is perhaps moving toward
adopting this requirement.7 It should. Compelling policy and
constitutional reasons support this requirement.
This article will review this support and the constitutional
necessity of recording8 interrogation statements. The article
will particularly describe current practices regarding the
admissibility of statements, review the benefits of recording,
analyze the state of the law on recording and the Supreme Court
of Montana's recording jurisprudence, and advocate the due
process basis for recording.
I. CURRENT PRACTICES AND INHERENT DEFICIENCIES

Currently, whether to admit a defendant's supposed
custodial interrogation statement is governed by Miranda v.
Arizona 9 and related inquiries.
Compliance with Miranda
assures the court that the defendant understood his rights when
he made the statements.
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a

6. See Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985) (holding that
unexcused failure to electronically record custodial interrogation conducted in place of
detention violated suspects' right to due process under Alaska Constitution, and
therefore defendants' statements were inadmissible); State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587,
592 (Minn. 1994) (holding that custodial interrogation shall be electronically recorded
where feasible and must be recorded when questioning occurs at place of detention). See
also Ragan v. State, 642 S.W.2d 489, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (holding that the trial
court erred in admitting tape recording for impeachment purposes over the appellant's
objection that it contained no warning that a recording was being made). At the time of
the Ragan decision, Texas statutorily limited the recording requirement to the
impeachment context: a recording was required only when a defendant's statements
were admitted for impeachment purposes. Since then, Texas has further narrowed the
recording requirement to the admission of oral or sign language statements of the
accused. TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 38.22(3)(a)(1) (West 1999).
7. See discussion infra Part IV.
8. This article premises the recording requirement on the availability of a
recording device. At the least, audio recording should be required, and where video
recording is available, it should be required. Indeed, much like Miranda, should a
recording requirement be imposed, law enforcement could easily incorporate video
recording of statements into their procedures. Indeed, video recording of drunk driving
suspects is standard operating procedure in many jurisdictions.
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that statements obtained from defendants during
incommunicado interrogation in police-dominated atmosphere, without full warning of
constitutional rights, were inadmissible and violated Defendant's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self- incrimination). Miranda's authority may be altered by the
Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted in part, 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999).
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right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The

defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
If,
however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking
there can be no questioning.' 0
As popularized by the television and movie industries, the
prosecution cannot use a defendant's statements responding to
custodial interrogation unless the defendant has been informed
of and freely waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent
and his Sixth Amendment right to consult an attorney.
Although a verbatim recital of the Miranda warnings is not
required and no particular "talismanic incantation" is
necessary," law enforcement agencies across the land utilize
pre-printed forms with a verbatim recital of the Miranda
warnings.
Recital of the warnings is not enough, however. "[A] heavy
burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed
counsel." 12 The United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed
this heavy burden to find a Miranda waiver, requiring:
First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in
the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice
rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.

Second, the

waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both of the
nature of the right being abandoned and consequences of the
13
decision to abandon it.

Thus, before admitting a statement, the court must
ascertain that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently waived his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. 14 At
the same time, the court must deploy a four-part inquiry. First,
did the accused make any statements? 15 Second, was the

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988).
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defendant in custody at the time of the statements? 16 Third,
were the statements made in response to interrogation by
government agents? 17 And, finally, the court must deem the
statements to have been voluntary.' 8 If a court is satisfied that
a defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his
Miranda rights, made statements in response to custodial
interrogation by government agents, and that the statements
were voluntary, the statements can be admitted. 19 Ultimately,
20
Of
that decision turns on the totality of the circumstances.
course, even with such a finding, the ultimate question remains:
what was said?
Current practices somewhat answer these inquiries. For
instance, the widespread availability and use of preprinted
Miranda warnings facilitates law enforcement compliance with
Miranda's prescripts.
Similarly, written Miranda waivers
signed (and sometimes additionally initialed) by the defendant
21
help demonstrate the defendant's knowing waiver of rights.
Even better, written statements signed by the defendant
certainly facilitate the fact-finder's determination of what the
defendant stated.
Each of these practices cast some light on what actually
happened during the interrogation and the statements of the
defendant; at the least, that light may be dim, and at its best, it
is only partially illuminating. The fact finder thus must resort
to testimony to guide its decision. That testimony provides
biased guidance: either it comes from officers who want the
statement admitted or it comes from the defendant who wants it
suppressed; the fact finder then is left trying to reconstruct an
invisible proceeding based on the testimony of witnesses with a
stake in the outcome. Recording solves this quagmire. It
provides a neutral, objective account of what transpired that

16. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990).
17. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297 (1980).
18. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972).
19. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298 (1980).
20. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 689 (1993) (quoting Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963) (quoting Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613,
623 (1896).
See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 223-27 (1973)
(discussing totality-of-circumstances approach); 1 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 6.2 (1984). Montana has adopted a similar analytical framework. See
generally State v. Blakney, 197 Mont. 131, 641 P.2d 1045 (1982); State v. Mayes, 251
Mont. 358, 825 P.2d 1196 (1992).
21. Written waivers are evaluated as part of the totality of the circumstances test.
See, e.g., Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046 (1983).
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answers each of the above inquiries. It is the best tool for aiding
the courts' totality of the circumstance determination.
Moreover, it preserves the substance of the statements
themselves and the context of the interrogation for evidence at
trial. 22
Thus, whether the issue is the admissibility of
statements or the reliability of the statements, recording
advances justice.
II. THE BENEFITS OF RECORDING
The advantages of recording suspect interrogations,
particularly its furtherance of due process, compel adopting such
a
requirement.
"[El lectronically
recording
custodial
interrogations promotes the goals of truth-finding, fair
treatment, and accountability in the legal process. By creating
an objective and reviewable record of police questioning, [it]
further[s] the policy objectives that underlie [the] dual concerns
for crime control and due process." 3 Alaska's Supreme Court
recognized that the advantages of recording cut both ways:2
The recording of custodial interrogations is not, however, a
measure intended to protect only the accused; a recording also
protects the public's interest in honest and effective law
enforcement, and the individual interests of those police officers
wrongfully accused of improper tactics. A recording, in many
cases, will aid law enforcement efforts, by confirming the content
and the voluntariness of a confession, when a defendant changes
his testimony or claims falsely that his constitutional rights were
violated. In any case, a recording
will help trial and appellate
25
courts to ascertain the truth.

Perhaps most importantly, recording of interrogations will
bring an invisible event to life. Otherwise, the trier of fact must
reconstruct what occurred months or even years before with
22. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 688 (1986) (confirming "that evidence
about the manner in which a confession was secured will often be germane to its
probative weight, a matter that is exclusively for the jury to assess").
23. Richard A. Leo, The Impact ofMiranda Revisited, 86 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
621,692 (1996).
24. If Montana had adopted a recording requirement, the result in State v.
Johnson, 177 Mont. 182, 580 P.2d 1387 (1978), may have been different. There,
dismissal resulted because even though a county attorney testified that the defendant
was Mirandized, there was no proof regarding what the defendant was told about his
rights and thus it was not possible to determine if the defendant was properly advised of
his rights. See id. at 188, 580 P.2d at 1390.
25. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1161 (Alaska 1985).
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incomplete information.
"Interrogation still takes place in
privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a
gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the
interrogation rooms." 26 At the outset, a recording will greatly
facilitate the Miranda and voluntariness analyses, and a
recording details factors relevant to credibility and the ultimate
issue-the substance of the defendant's statements: was the
defendant informed of his Miranda rights; did he understand
them; were they waived; was the waiver voluntary; was the
statement voluntary; was either the statement or waiver
coerced; the substantive questions asked; how they were asked;
and conversely the answers given and how the responses were
made; the interrogator's demeanor (and appearance) contrasted
with the suspect's behavior (and appearance); the fit between
what the tape reveals and the testimony of the people on the
tape; as the Eighth Circuit recognized, a tape will display if the
defendant "is hesitant, uncertain, or faltering,... [if] he has
been worn out by interrogation, physically abused , or in other
respects is acting involuntarily, the tape will corroborate him in
27
ways a typewritten statement would not."
Additionally, recording will curb improper police tactics. If
the interrogator knows he is on tape, he will act accordingly;
otherwise, he will risk "losing" his case as well as his reputation.
Police tactics are a real concern. In a 1998 Cornell Law Review
article, Boalt Hall Law Professor Charles D. Weisselberg
detailed the "outside Miranda" interrogation tactics promoted by
California law enforcement. 28
The article is replete with
examples of California law enforcement training materials
advocating the circumvention of Miranda. According to
Professor Weisselberg, "Police officers commonly refer to this
technique as questioning 'outside Miranda." 29
Professor
Weisselberg concludes that, "There can be no doubt that the
practice of questioning 'outside Miranda' has spread throughout
California."30 The Ninth Circuit recently addressed outsideMiranda questioning in an opinion denying qualified immunity

26.
27.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966).
Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 506 (8th Cir. 1972). The court further

stated, "we feel that [videotaped interrogations are] an advancement in the field of
criminal procedure and a protection of defendant's rights. We suggest that to the extent
possible,
28.
29.
30.

all statements of defendants should be so preserved." Id.
Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda,84 CoRNELL L. REV. 109 (1998).
Id. at 133.
Id. at 136.
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to officers who deploy such tactics.3 1
Conversely, recording will discourage defendants from
raising frivolous pretrial challenges to confessions. Relatedly,
recordings will impact the accused's trial decision. A defendant
faced with the cold recorded reality of his confession may be
convinced to plead guilty rather than expose his admissions to a
jury.
Many law enforcement agencies already videotape
confessions. 32
Regardless of the stage of the proceeding,
recording will facilitate justice and resolution of the case and
controversy.
It is beyond dispute that, unlike the courts, law enforcement
and defendants have an agenda beyond finding the truth.
Recording is necessary to promote the judicial function and the
search for the truth.
It is not because a police officer is more dishonest than the rest of
us that we... demand an objective recordation of the critical
events. Rather, it is because we are entitled to assume that he is

no less human - no less inclined to reconstruct and interpret past
events in a light most favorable to himself - that we should not
permit him be a judge of 33
his own cause.'
undoubtedly, are equally fallible.

Defendants,

As the Eighth Circuit explained, "For jurors to see as well as
hear the events surrounding an alleged confession or
incriminating statement is a forward step in the search for the
truth."34
Objectivity is particularly insightful when judging
credibility. A recording minimizes the swearing match between
law enforcement and the accused over what actually happened.
Experience teaches who wins that match. Not surprisingly,
internal law enforcement policy discourages recording.3 5 As

31.

See California Attorneys For Criminal Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.

1999) (amended 2000 WL 1639 January 3, 2000).
32. See WILLIAM A. GELLER, POLICE VIDEOTAPING OF SUSPECT INTERROGATIONS
AND CONFESSIONS: A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF ISSUES AND PRACTICES - A REPORT

To THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 152 (1992).
33. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1161 (Alaska 1985) (quoting Yale Kamisar,

Forward:Brewer v. Williams - A HardLook at a Discomfiting Record, 66 GEO. L. J. 209,
242-43 (1977-78)).
34. Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 507 (8th Cir. 1972).
35. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR SPECIAL
AGENTS, § 7-14 (discouraging recording of interviews and noting that if recorded, "the

questioning must be carefully prepared so that the tone of voice and wording of the
questions do not intimidate or coerce").

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2000

7

230

LAW
REVIEW
MontanaMONTANA
Law Review, Vol.
61 [2000],
Iss. 1, Art. 8

Vol. 61

Justice Douglas noted, "There is the word of the accused against
the police. But his voice has little persuasion."36 Recording will
not stack the deck against or favor the defendant. It will make
the process fairer. An objective recording cures the effect of the
human tendency to recollect events in a self-promoting manner.
Furthermore, fairness enhances integrity.
Absent a
recording, the courts must determine what happened during an
interrogation based on the testimony of the interested parties.
Such reliance, where an objective source is readily available, is
antiquated and erodes respect for, and the integrity of, the
judicial system.
III. THE STATE OF THE LAW
Requiring suspect interviews to be tape recorded has long
been recognized as an advancement in criminal justice. 37 It has
been adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
38
Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute.
Moreover, it is consistent with the apparent policy behind
Federal Rule of Evidence 1002 (Best Evidence Rule, requiring
an original writing or recording), Rule 613(a) (requiring that a
prior statement be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel), Rule
613(b) (allowing a witness to explain or deny a prior inconsistent
statement and affording the opposite party to interrogate the
witness thereon), and Rule 106 (allowing an adverse party to
require the proponent of a statement to introduce other parts of
the statement that should be considered with it). 39

More

importantly, recording is constitutionally necessary.
Concern for fundamental fairness and with the reality of
false confessions has prompted many commentators to advocate
recording. Those analysts note law enforcement's near total
control of the interrogation and the use of refined psychological
tools to gain confessions. 4° Commentators recognize that, "a
confession is universally treated as damning and compelling

36.
37.

Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433,446 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Legal Interrogationof Persons Accused or Suspected of

Crime, 24 J. AM. INST. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1014, 1017 (1934).
3& See UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 243 (1974) and the MODEL CODE
OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, § 130.4 at 37 (1975).
39. See also MONT. R. EVID. 106, 613, 1002.
40. See Wayne T. Westling and Vicki Waye, Videotaping Police Interrogations:
Lessons From Australia, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 493, 502-03 (1998). Advocating recording is
not limited to legal specialists. See, e.g., Editorial, Videotaping Has to be Mandatory,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 29, 1999, § 1 at 16.
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evidence of guilt [that] is likely to dominate all other case
evidence and lead a trier of fact to convict the defendant." 41
Recording, as a remedy for false confessions, ensures due
42
process.
Three other common-law countries have now adopted the
rule that police must tape record interviews with suspects. In
1988, a Code of Practice in Great Britain took effect that
generally requires that police tape record interviews with
suspects. A 1993 review of the requirement by the Royal
Commission on Criminal Justice reported that, "By general
consent, tape recording in the police station has proved to be a
strikingly successful innovation providing better safeguards for
the suspect and the police officer alike."43 Similarly, Canada
now has a policy of mandatory videotaping of confessions. 44 In
Australia, because of allegations of police "verballing" (that is,
fabricating verbal confessions), the High Court held that police
must record all confessions or the jury will receive a cautionary
instruction suggesting police testimony may be unreliable. 45
Thus far, two American jurisdictions have imposed an
interrogation recording requirement. 46 The Supreme Court of
Minnesota did so under its "supervisory authority to insure the
fair administration of justice," holding "that all custodial
interrogation including any information about rights, any
waiver of those rights, and all questioning shall be electronically
recorded where feasible and must be recorded when questioning
47
occurs at a place of detention."
The Supreme Court of Alaska requires recording as a
matter of due process. The Alaska high court held "that an
unexcused failure to electronically record a custodial
interrogation conducted in a place of detention violates a
41. Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological
Interrogation,88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMiNOLOGY 429, 429 (1998).
42. See, e.g., Gal Johnson, False Confessions and Fundamental Fairness: The
Need ForElectronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations,6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 719, 735
(1997).
43.

REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 26 (1993).

44. See Alan Grant, The Audio-Visual Taping of Police Interviews with Suspects
and Accused Persons by Halton Regional Police Force, Ontario, Canada - An Evaluation
Final Report 28 (1987).
45. McKinney v. R., 65 A.L.R. 241 (Austl. 1991).
46. Texas requires a recording in narrow circumstances. See Ragan v. State, 642
S.W.2d 489, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 38.22
(West 1999); supranote 6.
47. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994).
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suspect's right to due process, under the Alaska Constitution,
and that any statement thus obtained is generally
inadmissible." 48 Persuaded by the policy reasons discussed
supra, the court ruled that, "Such recording is a requirement of
state due process when the interrogation occurs in a place of
detention and recording is feasible. We reach this conclusion
because we are convinced that recording, in such circumstances,
is now a reasonable and necessary safeguard, essential to the
adequate protection of the accused's right to counsel, his right
against self incrimination and, ultimately, his right to a fair
49

trial."

The Alaska court further recognized that the recording
requirement enhances judicial integrity.
The integrity of our judicial system is subject to question
whenever a court rules on the admissibility of a questionable
confession, based solely upon the court's acceptance of the
testimony of an interested party, whether it be the interrogating
officer or the defendant. This is especially true when objective
evidence of the circumstances surrounding the confession could
have been preserved by the mere flip of a switch. Routine and
systematic recording of custodial interrogations will provide such
evidence, and avoid any suggestion that the court is biased in
favor of either party. 50
To preserve constitutional rights and promote judicial
integrity, Alaska invoked the exclusionary rule:
Exclusion is warranted [when a tape recording is not made of the
entire interview] because the arbitrary failure to preserve the
entire conversation directly affects a defendant's ability to present
his defense at trial or at a suppression hearing. Moreover,
exclusion of the defendant's statement is the only remedy which
will correct the wrong that has been done and "place the defendant
in the same position he or she would have been in had the
evidence been preserved and turned over in time for use at trial."51
The remaining jurisdictions which have considered the
recording requirement have rejected it.52
48. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985).
49. Id. at 1159-60.
50. Id. at 1164.
51. Id. at 1164 (footnote and citation omitted).
52. See, e.g., Stoker v. State, 692 N.E.2d 1386 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
State Constitution imposed no specific duty upon law enforcement officers to record or

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol61/iss1/8

10

2000
RECORDING
233
Donovan and Rhodes:
Comes a Time:INTERROGATIONS
The Case for Recording Interrogations
IV. RECORDING AND THE SUPREME COURT OF MONTANA
The Supreme Court of Montana first considered the
recording requirement in State v. Grey.5 3
Grey involved
employee theft from an auto parts store. 54 Mr. Grey was the
primary suspect, thus the police requested that he go to the
Kalispell Police Department for an interview. 55 Grey claimed
that he was not given his Miranda warnings; law enforcement
maintained otherwise, claiming that Mr. Grey was Mirandized
but conceding they did not obtain a written waiver or record the
56
Miranda invocation, although the interview was videotaped.
Grey moved to suppress his statement and videotape on
numerous Fifth Amendment grounds, including the recording
argument. 57 The district court denied his motion. 58
The
preserve custodial interrogations in places of detention); People v. Fike, 577 N.W.2d 903
(Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the due process clause of the State Constitution does
not require that custodial confessions be electronically recorded); People v. Holt, 937
P.2d 213 (1997) ( holding that lack of recording statements did not violate due process
clause of the State and Federal Constitutions); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 661 N.E.2d 1326
(Mass. 1996) (holding that custodial statements that were not electronically recorded did
not have to be suppressed); Commonwealth v. Craft, 669 A.2d 394 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)
(holding due process requirements of Pennsylvania Constitution did not require
recording of custodial confession); State v. Kekona, 886 P.2d 740 (Haw. 1994) (holding
that failure to electronically record custodial interrogation was not due process
violation); State v. Kilmer, 439 S.E.2d 881 (W. Va. 1993) (holding that due process clause
of State Constitution does not require that police electronically record custodial
interrogation of accused); State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that interrogation of defendant did not have to be recorded under State Constitution);
State v. Buzzell, 617 A.2d 1016 (Me. 1992) (holding that due process clause of Maine
Constitution did not require recording of custodial interrogation when feasible); People v.
Raibon, 843 P.2d 46, 48 (Colo. App. 1992), cert. denied, No. 89-CA-1126 (Jan. 11, 1993)
(holding that the failure to videotape or audiotape the defendant's statements did not
violate his due process rights under the Colorado Constitution); State v. Rhoades, 820
P.2d 665, 675 (Idaho 1991) (holding that statements made in custody do not have to be
tape recorded in order to be admissible); People v. Everette, 543 N.E.2d 1040 (Ill. App.
3d 1989) (holding that failure to record defendant's statements did not violate due
process clause of Illinois Constitution); Coleman v. State, 375 S.E.2d 663 (Ga. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that police were not required to electronically record defendant's custodial
statements in order for statements to be admissible); State v. Gorton, 548 A.2d 419 (Vt.
1988) (holding that due process clause did not require tape recording of defendant's
inculpatory custodial statements as prerequisite to their admission at trial); Williams v.
State, 522 So.2d 201, 208 (Miss. 1988) (refusing to require recording for admission of
defendant's statement during interrogation).
53. 274 Mont. 206, 907 P.2d 951 (1995) (holding that police procedures violated
defendant's constitutional rights).
54. See id. at 208, 907 P.2d. at 952.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 209, 907 P.2d at 953.
58. See id. at 209, 907 P.2d at 952.
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Supreme Court reversed "[biased on the totality of the
circumstances of police deception and failure to give Grey an
adequate Miranda warning."5 9
The Court did so without reaching the recording issue but
nonetheless commented on it: the Court's gratuitous
commentary reflects the fact that recording greatly aids the
judiciary's task; as the Court noted, "It is immeasurably more
difficult for the State to sustain its burden to prove the
voluntariness of a confession when there is no record of the
Miranda warning other than the officer's testimony that he gave
them."60 The benefits of recording facilitates the Miranda
inquiry. "Significantly, none of the decisions regarding the
admissibility of a confession turns on the presence or absence of
a single controlling criterion, each reflects a careful scrutiny of
all the surrounding circumstances." 6 1 Recording illuminates
62
most, if not all, of the criteria.
Despite its commentary, the Court stopped short of
imposing a recording requirement. "We do not hold that the
police must tape record or create an audio-visual record of
Miranda warnings and the detainee's waiver, as Grey urges we
should and as some jurisdictions have."63 The Court appeared to
limit its ruling based on a Separation of Powers rationale.
"Although [recording] may be the better practice and would help
assure that the accused receives a constitutionally adequate
Miranda warning while, at the same time, enhancing the
prosecution's ability to meet its burden to prove voluntariness,
we leave the imposition of any such procedural requirement to
64
the legislature and to individual law enforcement agencies."
As urged infra, the recording requirement cannot be dismissed
as a legislative issue; it is a constitutional issue necessitating
judicial protection.
Finally, the Court did announce that the failure to record,
where such aid was available, is a factor for courts to consider
when adjudicating suppression issues.

59. State v. Grey, 274 Mont. 206, 214, 907 P.2d 951, 956 (1995).
60. Id. at 213, 907 P.2d at 955.
61. Id. at 210, 907 P.2d at 954 (citing Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
226 (1973)).

62.

See State v. Hermes, 273 Mont. 446, 449-50, 904 P.2d 587, 589 (1995)

(identifying factors relevant to totality of the circumstances analysis).
63. State v. Grey, 274 Mont. 206, 21, 907 P.2d 951, 956 (1995) (citing Stephan v.
State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985) and State v. Scales, 518 N.W. 2d 587 (Minn. 1994)).
64. Id. at 213-14, 907 P.2d at 955-56.
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We do hold, that, in the context of a custodial interrogation

conducted at the station house or under other similarly controlled
circumstances, the failure of the police officer to preserve some
tangible record of his or her giving of the Miranda warning and
the knowing, intelligent waiver by the detainee will be viewed
with distrust in the judicial assessment of voluntariness under the
totality of circumstances surrounding the confession or admission.
That is all the more so where the evidence demonstrates that, as
here, the police officer made a conscious decision not to secure a

written waiver or otherwise preserve his giving of the Miranda
warning and the detainee's waiver on the premise that to do so
would alert the accused
to exercise his rights and, thus, jeopardize
65
the interrogation.
The Supreme Court of Montana revisited the recording

issue in State v. Cassell.6 6 In Cassell, a homicide case, the
defendant claimed that he was not given a Miranda warning
and moved to suppress his confession on that and related
grounds.67 Law enforcement testified that officers read the
defendant his Miranda rights and that the defendant waived the
rights.6s The officers then recorded the interview of Mr.
Cassell.6 9 During the recorded interview, the officers did not
question the defendant regarding his rights or have him
acknowledge that he had been informed of those rights and was
willing to waive them.70 The same procedure characterized a
second recorded interview: law enforcement claimed that they
had asked Mr. Cassell if he would like his rights read to him
again before the recording began and that Mr. Cassell said that
he understood his rights, none of which was recorded. 71 The
recording captured the interrogation but did not reference that
Mr. Cassell had been informed of his rights.7 2 A claimed third
73
interview was not recorded at all.

Mr. Cassell relied on Grey to argue that law enforcement
must record a defendant's waiver of his rights. 74 The Court
factually distinguished Grey, ruling that in Grey "the Miranda
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 214, 907 P.2d at 956.
280 Mont. 397, 932 P.2d 478 (1996).
Id. at 399, 932 P.2d at 479.
See id.

69.

See id.

70.
71.
72.

See id.
See id. at 402, 932 P.2d at 481.
See State v. Cassell, 280 Mont. 397, 402, 932 P.2d 478, 481 (1996).

73.

See id.

74.

See id.
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warnings were inadequately given" and that "the law
enforcement officers used impermissible tactics, including lying
and deception, to obtain Grey's confession."7 5 The Court found
76
no such facts in Cassell.
The Court's factual distinction leaves open the question of
extending Grey and requiring recordings for statements or
confessions to be admissible. Although Cassell was careful to
establish a factual distinction from Grey, the Court did reiterate
its holding in Grey:
Law enforcement officers should be encouraged to preserve a
tangible waiver of advising defendants of their rights and a

defendant's waiver of those rights. To the extent that they do not,
that failure will be viewed with distrust. We declined in Grey,
however, to require that interviews be tape recorded. How the
record is preserved is still up to the law enforcement officers.
Grey did not set out a rule of exclusion, but a guideline for

weighing evidence. Here the law enforcement officers established
to the court's satisfaction that the Miranda warnings were

properly given and that no impermissible tactics were used and
that under the totality of the circumstances the confessions were
voluntary. That is all that is required. The fact that the warnings

and waiver were not preserved tangibly, even if viewed with
distrust, does not terminate the inquiry, if the court is satisfied
from all the available evidence, that the State's burden of proof
77
was met.

Two justices, Trieweiler and Hunt, were not satisfied with
this affirmation of Grey. They recognized the troubling silence
caused by the officers deliberate failure to record the Miranda
events. Thus, via a concurring opinion, they "would require
either a written waiver of a defendant's right to remain silent, or
a record of the Miranda advice that was given to that person and
his or her response."78
In reaching this conclusion, the
concurrence noted that the officers admitted that they did not
record the Miranda waiver "because during that time they were
establishing rapport with the suspect."7 9 This poor excuse
illustrates the necessity of recording. As noted by Justice
Trieweiler:

75. Id. at 403, 932 P.2d at 481.
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. State v. Cassell, 280 Mont. 397, 404, 932 P.2d 478, 482 (1996) (Trieweiler, J.,
concurring).
79. Id.
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The excuse given for not recording Cassell's waiver of his Fifth
Amendment rights is equally inadequate. In this case, his
interrogators wanted to establish a rapport with him. However,
that apparently having been accomplished, nothing prevented
them from obtaining an acknowledgment from Cassell, once the
recorder had been turned on, that he. had been advised of his

rights and had waived them.
Certainly, that kind of
acknowledgment could not have been any more disturbing to him
than being asked during a tape
recorded interview whether he
80
committed deliberate homicide.
Poor excuses typify failures to record, emboldening
suspicions about why law enforcement officers and prosecutors
resist such a requirement.
As canvassed supra, absent a recording, the courts "are
required to speculate about what actually transpired, based on
the relative credibility of the witnesses to the conversation."1
Where the courts could eradicate this speculation by imposing a
recording requirement, the courts failure to do so raises more
questions and engenders distrust of the criminal justice system.
Of course, law enforcement cannot be expected to advocate
recording. Where the courts are left to speculate about what
actually happened, "It is no secret that law enforcement will
nearly always win that contest.
Therefore, they have no
incentive to record that part of the conversation, and it follows,
82
they have little incentive to actually give the required advice."
The Cassell concurrence noted these policy
and
constitutional reasons for adopting a recording requirement. It
similarly relied on many of the other compelling factors
discussed in section II, supra. For instance, it highlighted the
economy and prosecutorial benefit that recording would ensure:
On the other hand, assuming the advice was given, that it was
understood, and that the rights were waived, why not record the
conversation and avoid the inevitable challenge to the admission
or confession? That simple practice would have saved time for the
prosecuting attorney, the defense attorney, the trial court, and
this Court because it would have established with certainty that
Cassell's statement was either voluntary or that it should be
suppressed, in compliance with the Constitution, as applied in
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d
80.
81.

Id. at 405-06, 932 P.2d at 483.
Id. at 404, 932 P.2d at 482.

82.

Id.
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The concurrence also recognized the objectivity, fairness,
and integrity that comes with a recording:
The problem is that, in this case, as in Grey, we have no direct
knowledge of any of those three [totality of the circumstances]
factors. The trial court, and this Court, are required to speculate
about all three factors by trying to weigh the relative credibility of

the people involved in the interrogation. Such an unreliable
process is inexcusable when it is unnecessary because a means of
absolute verification was readily available. 84
The concurrence further rooted its conclusion in plain
commonsense:
When the means is available, as it was in this case, there is no
practical justification for the State's failure to record a custodial
interrogation. By its failure to do so, it jeopardizes the prosecution
by risking suppression of incriminating statements which have
been legally obtained.
Just as importantly, it makes any
determination that detainees have been illegally questioned
virtually impossible. Neither outcome is acceptable when the
85

means to avoid it is readily available.

For now, two Montana Supreme Court justices have
recognized
the
necessity
of
recording
statements.
Overwhelming policy and constitutional reasons compel this
requirement. And the Court has indicated that it may not be
done with the issue. This past year, in State v. Worrall, the
Court was careful to state, "While we have not, to date, held that
law enforcement officers must memorialize the giving of
Miranda warnings prior to interrogation or interviews with
witnesses .... "-86 The Court's inclusion of the "to date" language
in Worrall may indicate that the Court is still considering and
perhaps moving toward adopting such a requirement.
That is exactly what happened in both Alaska and
Minnesota, where the respective supreme courts evolved to a
recording requirement.
In Scales, the Supreme Court of

83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 404-05, 932 P.2d at 482.
State v. Cassell, 280 Mont. 397, 405, 932 P.2d 478, 482 (1996).
Id. at 406, 932 P.2d at 483.
State v. Worrall, 293 Mont. 439, 451, 976 P.2d 968, 976 (1999) (emphasis

added).
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Minnesota noted that, "In previous cases, we have been
concerned about the failure of law enforcement officers to record
In those previous cases, the
custodial interrogations." 7
Minnesota court adopted the Grey holding. As explained in
Scales, in earlier cases, the court "'urge[d] ...law enforcement

professionals [to] use those technological means at their disposal
to fully preserve those conversations and events preceding the
actual interrogation' and warned that we would 'look with great
disfavor upon any further refusal to heed these admonitions.'9
"[D]isturbed by the fact that law enforcement officials ignored
[the court's] warnings,"8 9 Scales decided "that the recording of
custodial interrogations 'is now a reasonable and necessary
safeguard, essential to the adequate protection of the accused's
right to counsel, his right against self incrimination and,
ultimately, his right to a fair trial.'"9°
The Minnesota court based this holding on its supervisory
authority. 91 The Supreme Court of Montana possesses the same
authority and could impose a recording requirement to assure
the fair and effective administration of justice. 92 Indeed, in the
past, the Montana Court has exercised such authority because,
"Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."93 As detailed
above, when the courts refuse to adopt a recording requirement,
rely on the testimony of interested parties to resolve suppression
issues, and almost always side with law enforcement, the
integrity of the courts becomes an issue. Montana's Supreme
Court has made it clear that, "The people's confidence in the
ability of the courts to administer justice must not be
diminished. A state ruled by law cannot afford any perceived
notion that justice is not being served by the judiciary."94 The
Court justified the exercise of its supervisory authority on this
basis. It should consider exercising that authority and imposing
a recording requirement to eliminate the "aura of possible bias
or prejudice"95 that currently plagues the admission of
87. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 591 (citing State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217,
224 (Minn. 1988); State v. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d 327, 333 (Minn. 1991)).
88. Id. (quoting State v. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d 327, 333 (Minn. 1991)).

89.

Id. at 592.

90. Id. (quoting Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1159-60 (Alaska 1985)).
91. See id.
92. See MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
93. Washington v. Montana Mining Properties, Inc., 243 Mont. 509, 516, 795 P.2d
460, 464(1990).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 516, 795 P.2d at 465.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2000

17

240

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Montana Law Review, Vol. 61 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 8

Vol. 61

unrecorded statements.
Alaska experienced an evolution similar to that in
Minnesota. Before the Supreme Court of Alaska adopted a
recording requirement in Stephan, the court had previously
instructed law enforcement to record interrogations. Stephan
chronicled this evolution. 96 Alaska first addressed the issue in
Mallott v. State.97 There, in a footnote, Alaska's high court
"advise[d] law enforcement agencies that as part of their duty to
preserve evidence, it is incumbent upon them to tape record,
where feasible, any questioning and particularly that which
occurs in a place of detention."98
The court addressed the issue again that same year in S.B.
v. State.99 As in Mallott, and once again in a footnote, the court
encouraged recording but did not specify the consequence for
failure to do so: "In future cases, it will be a great aid to the trial
court's determinations and our own review of the record if an
electronic record of the police interview with a defendant is
available from which the circumstances of a confession or other
waiver of Miranda rights may be ascertained." 100
The court visited the issue for a third time in 1980.
McMahan v. State'0 reiterated the "Mallott Rule," advising law
enforcement to record interviews where feasible, and adding
that "if Miranda rights are read to the defendant, this too should
be recorded." 02 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Alaska took
the Mallott Rule to its logical conclusion and imposed the
recording requirement in Stephan. Montana's Supreme Court
should be encouraged to do the same.
Worrall itself reflects the evolving nature of Montana's
constitutional jurisprudence. There, the Supreme Court applied
the Grey instruction, holding that unrecorded interviews or
statements of informants used for search warrant applications
will be viewed with distrust. Specifically, the Court held "that
absent the demonstration of exigent circumstances or some
other compelling reason, the failure of the investigating officer
to preserve some tangible record of the citizen informant's
statements made in the controlled environment of the station
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1157-58 (Alaska 1985).
608 P.2d 737 (Alaska 1980).
Id. at 743 n.5.
614 P.2d 786(1980).
Id. at 789 n.9 (citing Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d 737, 743 n.5 (Alaska 1980)).
617 P.2d 494, 499 n.11 (Alaska 1980).

102.

Id.
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house, will be viewed with distrust in the judicial assessment of
the truthfulness of the state's declarations made in the search
warrant application to the extent those declarations are based
on the citizen informant's statements." 10 3 The Supreme Court's
extension of Grey to the statements of citizen informants in
Worrall followed similar applications of Grey to the preservation
of the results of a thermal imaging scan'0 4 and interviews of
10 5
children in sexual abuse cases.
In reaching its holding, Worrall seized upon many of the
policy reasons that compel a recording requirement. For
instance, the Court recognized the bias inherent in judging a norecord swearing match between experienced law enforcement
officers and the defendant. 10 6 This fact coupled with law
enforcement's perhaps conscious decision not to record troubled
the Court because corrupt performance of law enforcement is
"difficult if not impossible to substantiate" "absent a concession
from the law enforcement officer." 07 The Court emphasized
that this problem, which degrades the integrity of the criminal
justice system, "simply does not have to exist at all."10 8 As the

Court concluded:
We doubt that there is a police station or sheriffs office in

Montana that does not have paper and pens for note-taking and,
more than likely, a typewriter for preparing statements, a tape
recorder for recording those, and, in many cases, audio-visual
recording equipment. Memorializing the reading of an accused's
rights, or an accused's confession, or, as in the case at bar, a
citizen informant's statement in the controlled environment of the
stationhouse, absent exigent circumstances, is neither an onerous
nor a high-tech enterprise. Importantly, doing so avoids the sort
of "who said what to whom" challenges that require trial courts to
be arbiters of the credibility disputes that are nearly always
resolved against the defendant. l0 9

103. State v. Worrall, 293 Mont. 439, 454, 976 P.2d 968, 978 (1999).
104. See State v. Siegal, 281 Mont. 250, 278, 934 P.2d 176, 192 (1996) (holding that
failure to preserve some tangible record of the results of a thermal imaging scan should
be viewed with judicial distrust, though law enforcement officers are not required by law
to create a video recording of the result of such a scan).
105. See State v. Weaver, 290 Mont. 58, 73-74, 964 P.2d 713, 723 (1998) (declining
to adopt a per se rule that interviews of child sexual abuse victims be recorded, but
recognizing that "the better practice may be to create some record of the interviews.").
106. See State v. Worrall, 293 Mont. 439, 452-53, 976 P.2d 968, 977 (1999).
107. Id. at 453, 976 P.2d at 977-78.
108. Id. at 453, 976 P.2d at 978.

109.

Id. at 453-54, 976 P.2d at 978.
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Worrall reflects the Supreme Court's concern for objectivity,
the integrity of the process, and the promotion of fundamental
rights. Moreover, as noted, Worrall expressly suggested that
Grey may be extended to require recording for a statement to be
admitted, when the Court wrote, "we have not, to date, held that
law enforcement officers must memorialize the giving of
Miranda warnings prior to interrogation." 110
Given this
suggestion, the fact that two justices have announced their
support of a recording rule, the similarity between Montana's
current rule in Grey and the evolution to a recording
requirement in Minnesota and Alaska, the compelling support
for such a requirement, and for the reasons discussed infra,
defendants should continue to litigate the recording issue in
Montana.
V. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES RECORDING
In Grey, the Court left "the imposition of any such
procedural [recording] requirement to the legislature and to
individual law enforcement agencies.""'
That perspective
mimicked the Ninth Circuit's ruling in United States v.
Coades.112 There, the federal appellate court dismissed the
recording argument as a legislative issue, "not for a court
exercising an appellate function." 1 3 That Separation of Powers
analysis, however, ignores the fact that Miranda originated with
the courts, not the legislature, and that the exclusionary rule is
presumed to be a judicial device, not a Constitutional or
legislative mandate, and that the courts historically have
fashioned remedies to preserve and protect Constitutional
rights. 114 Moreover, recording statements is more than a public
policy issue, it is a question of fundamental fairness, otherwise
known as due process.

110. Id. at 451, 976 P.2d at 977 (emphasis added).
111. 274 Mont. 206, 214, 907 P.2d 950, 956 (1995). Such deference arguably
violates the Separation of Powers and represents an abdication of judicial duty where it
is known that law enforcement discourages recording. See supra note 32.
112. 549 F.2d 1303, 1305 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that testimony as to the
defendant's confession was not subject to suppression merely because it was unrecorded).
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (affirming the court's
power under the Fourth Amendment to place limitations on federal law enforcement
searches and seizures).
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A. The ConstitutionalityOf ProphylacticRules
Since its genesis, its attackers have discounted Miranda
and its invocation as establishing prophylactic rules not
required by the Constitution. 11 5 This position ignores the fact
that "prophylactic" rules are "a central and necessary feature of
n6
constitutional law."
As this article advocates, "prophylactic" rules have been
constitutionally enshrined to compensate for fact-finding
limitations. Such jurisprudence occurred in North Carolina v.
Pearce,117 where the United States Supreme Court held that
"whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a
defendant after a new trial, the reasons [for] doing so must
affirmatively appear [and] must be based upon objective
information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the
118
defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing."
Absent this demonstration, a "presumption of vindictiveness"
dictates a due process violation. The Court later clarified that
the Pearce rule was prophylactic, analogous to Miranda, and
designed to preserve the integrity of criminal justice. 119
Similarly, Edwards v. Arizona 120 developed Miranda by
establishing that when a suspect asserts his right to counsel, the
suspect may not be questioned further unless he initiates the
conversation. 121 The Court has since referred to that principle
as "the bright-line, prophylactic Edwards rule," 122 explaining
that, "The rule ensures that any statement is not the result of
coercive pressures. Edwards conserves judicial resources which
would otherwise be expended in making difficult determinations
of voluntariness." 123 A recording rule would provide the same
benefit, and although it may be labeled prophylactic, it is a
115. See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 578 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1999) (No. 99-5525).
116. David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of ProphylacticRules, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 190,
190(1988).
117. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
118. Id. at 726.
119. See Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 50-53 (1973) (holding that Pearce's
prophylactic rules were not retroactively applicable to a post-sentencing hearing).
120. 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that once a defendant has invoked his Fifth

Amendment right to counsel, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by
showing only that he responded to police-initiated interrogation after another Miranda
warning).
121.
122.
123.

See id. at 484-85.
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682 (1988).
Id. at 151.
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constitutional measure. As noted by Professor David Strauss,
"'Prophylactic' rules are, in an important sense, the norm, not
the exception. Constitutional law is filled with rules that are
justified in ways that are analytically indistinguishable from the
justifications for the Miranda rules." 124
Even the United States Department of Justice has
recognized the constitutionality of Miranda specifically and
prophylactic rules generally. Responding to the Fourth Circuit's
ruling that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 overrules Miranda, 25 the United
States petitioned the Supreme Court to reinstate Miranda's
primacy. 26 In its brief in support of its petition, the United
States argued that Miranda and its progeny implement and
effectuate constitutional rights and as such are binding on
Congress. 27 The Justice Department based its analysis on the
fact that the Supreme Court "has consistently applied Miranda
to the States" and on "federal habeas review of state convictions
- a holding that can be explained only on the premise that
Miranda states a rule of constitutional law." 28 The United
States further noted that the Court "regularly described the
Miranda holding, and subsequent extensions of that holding, as
resting on constitutional grounds." 129 Quoting the Supreme
Court, the United States noted "'[pirophylactic' though it may
be, in protecting a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, Miranda safeguards 'a fundamental
trial right.'' 130 Finally, in detailing Miranda's constitutional
stature, the United States canvassed the prevalence of
124.

David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of ProphylacticRules, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 190,

195 (1988).
125. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted
(U.S. Dec. 6, 1999) (No. 99-5525).

126.

See generally United States' Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari,

Dickerson v.United States (No. 99-5525).

127. See id. at 6 (citing City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516-29 (1997)).
128. Id. at 8.
129. Id. at 24-25 (citing Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990) (describing
Miranda rules as resting on "the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination");
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 411 (noting holding of Arizona v. Roberson, "that the

Fifth Amendment bars police-initiated interrogation following a suspect's request for
counsel in the context of a separate investigation"); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625,
629 (1986) ("The Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination
provides the right to counsel at custodial interrogations."); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 427 (1986) (describing Miranda as "our interpretation of the Federal Constitution");
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481-82 (1981) (describing Miranda as having
"determined that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments[]" required custodial
interrogation to be preceded by advice concerning the suspect's rights)).
130. Id. at 25 (quoting Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S.685, 691 (1991)).
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prophylactic rules and their uncontroverted presence in
constitutional jurisprudence.' 3 ' Given this analysis, federal and
state governments will have difficulty dismissing the recording
132
argument as an extra-constitutional prophylactic rule.
B. Due Process Requires Recording
Due process has frequently been reworded as fundamental
fairness. 133 That is the core of the argument for recording. It is
simply fair. "Due Process is that which comports with the
3 4
Put
deepest notions of what is fair and right and just."
differently, "Whether the trial be federal or state, the concern of
35
due process is with the fair administration of justice."
Recording is a question of due process.
More pointedly, recording provides what due process
requires. For instance, Justice White has noted that "the right
to an impartial decision-maker is required by due process."'136 As
argued above, a recording and its objectivity heightens the
impartiality of the decision-maker who, absent a recording,
must rely on the subjective testimony of interested parties to
Without a
determine suppression and substantive issues.
recording requirement, the partiality of the fact finder taints the
criminal justice system. Consequently, a recording requirement
would enhance the appearance of justice, which courts have
repeatedly highlighted as central to due process.
131. See id. at 44-46 (citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986);
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969);
Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 (1984); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368,
372-377 (1982); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 166 (1972); Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123 (1968); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965)).
132. The Ninth Circuit appears to agree with the United States that Miranda has
developed into a Constitutional doctrine. See California Attorneys For Criminal Justice
v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999) (amended 2000 WL 1639 January 3, 2000).
The Supreme Court may address this issue, as well as prophylactic rules, selfincrimination rights, and due process generally, in Dickerson.
133. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 289-90 (1986) (characterizing
a Miranda violation as fundamentally unfair and thus in violation of the Due Process
Clause); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 47 (1972) (Burger, J., concurring)
("principle of due process [ requires fundamental fairness in criminal trials*); see also
State v. Sullivan, 280 Mont. 25, 33, 927 P.2d 1033, 1038 (identifying Montana's due
process and self-incrimination rights as "undeniably fundamental constitutional rights")
(citing State v. Finley, 276 Mont. 126, 138, 915 P.2d 208, 216 (1996)).
134. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
135. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 464 (1971).
136. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 197 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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As Justice Harlan succinctly put it, "the appearance of
137
evenhanded justice [ I is at the core of due process."
Furthermore, Justice Frankfurter explained that due process is
a fluid concept that evolves with time and that the courts must
develop to ensure fundamental fairness:
But "due process," unlike some legal rules, is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances. Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis
respect enforced by law for that feeling of just treatment which
has been evolved through centuries of Anglo-American
constitutional history and civilization, "due process" cannot be
imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any formula.
Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and
man, and more particularly between the individual and
government, "due process" is compounded of history, reason, the
past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the
democratic faith which we profess. Due process is not a
mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a
delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise
of judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the
unfolding of the process. Fully aware of the enormous powers thus
given to the judiciary and especially to its Supreme Court, those
who founded this Nation put their trust in a judiciary truly
independent-in judges not subject to the fears or allurements of a
limited tenure and by the very nature38 of their function detached
from passing and partisan influences. 1
Finally, recording furthers the fundamental, absolute right
to a fair trial guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
clause. The right to a fair trial "is the most fundamental of all
freedoms." 139 "[Miore than an instrument of justice and more
than one wheel of the Constitution[,] it is the lamp that shows
that freedom lives." 140 A recording requirement would certainly
brighten that lamp. As this century nears its end, characterized
by technological innovation and particularly the ready
availability of recording devices throughout America, due
process and fundamental fairness demand a recording

137. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 469 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
138. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
139. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
140. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 n. 23 (1968) (quoting PATRICK DEVLIN,
TRIAL BY JURY 164 (1956)).

Montana shares this priority and recognizes the judiciary's

duty to ensure it. See, e.g., State v. Green, 143 Mont. 234, 240, 388 P.2d 362, 365 (1964).
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requirement. 141
VI. FINAL THOUGHTS
Grey should be reconsidered. "The concept of due process is
not static; among other things, it must change to keep pace with
new technological developments." 142 It cannot be denied that,
"Judicial solutions to problems of constitutional dimension have
evolved decade by decade. As courts have been presented with
the need to enforce constitutional rights, they have found means
of doing so." 1 The United States Supreme Court has employed
tape recordings to determine voluntariness. 1 Furthermore,
many jurisdictions
permit the introduction of taped
confessions. 145 That government is quick to exploit recorded
confessions where it furthers convictions but resists an acrossthe-board-police-station requirement heightens the unfairness
and distrust that result from not requiring recording.
In Montana, the momentum for constitutionalizing
recording may be in place. Perhaps, as happened in Minnesota
and Alaska, the judiciary will tire of law enforcement's lame
excuses and failure to heed the judicial warnings advocating
recording and determine that nothing short of a firm
requirement will ensure the justice that recording provides. The
constitutional bases for such a requirement are available in the
supervisory authority of the Supreme Court of Montana, 1' the
Due Process Clauses in the Federal Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the self-incrimination provisions of Federal Fifth
Amendment, the Due Process Clause in article II, section 17 of
the Montana Constitution, the self-incrimination protection
afforded by section 25 of that same article, the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and Montana's guarantee of the
same right in article II, section 24 of the Montana Constitution.
The synergy resulting from these multiple sources furthers the
recording argument.

141. At the least, if the courts reject a recording requirement, all of the arguments
in support of recording alternatively support a jury instruction that, if the statement was
not recorded, such failure, where recording was feasible, should result in the jury
viewing the statement with distrust. See State v. Grey, 274 Mont. 206, 214, 907 P.2d
951, 956 (1995).

142.

Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1161 (Alaska 1985).

143.
144.
145.

2 DAVID RODSTEIN, ET AL., CRIMINAL CONSTITUIoNAL LAW 1 4.01[2] (1998).
See California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 356-357, 361-362 (1981).
See supra note 5.

146.

See MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
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Importantly, when considering these constitutional sources,
it must be remembered that Montana trumpets its prerogative
to extend constitutional rights beyond those guaranteed by the
United States Constitution, 1 47 that is the Montana Supreme
Court has recognized that, "As long as we guarantee the
minimum rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution,
we are not compelled to march lock-step with pronouncements of
the United States Supreme Court if our own constitutional
provisions call for more individual rights protection than that
guaranteed
by
the
United
States
Constitution."148
Unfortunately, with respect to self-incrimination, the Supreme
Court has held that Montana's Constitution provides no greater
protection than the Fifth Amendment.149 That interpretation
has been repeatedly attacked, 150 and may be subject to
revision.15 '
Furthermore, while the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Self-Incrimination Clause of Article II, Section
25 to mirror the application of the Fifth Amendment, it has not
similarly limited Montana's Due Process Clause nor the State's
constitutional guarantee of counsel.
Thus, Montana may
interpret these rights more broadly than the United States
Supreme Court interprets their federal counterparts because
"[sitates are free to grant citizens greater protections based on
state constitutional provisions than the United States Supreme
Court divines from the United States Constitution." 52 As the
Court stated, identical language does not necessitate identical
interpretation: "We have chosen not to 'march lock-step' with the
United States Supreme Court, even when applying nearly
identical language." 5 3
These sources, along with the policies and arguments
147. See generally William Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
148. State v. Sierra, 214 Mont. 472, 476, 692 P.2d 1273, 1276 (1985).
149. See State v. Jackson, 206 Mont. 338, 348, 672 P.2d 255, 260 (1983).

150. See, e.g., id. at 357, 672 P.2d at 264-65 (Shea, J., dissenting); State v. Finley,
276 Mont. 126, 151-52; 915 P.2d 208, 224-25 (1977) (Leaphart, J., dissenting); Ronald
K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions - The Montana Disaster, 63 TEX. L. REV.
1095 (1985)
151. See generally James H. Goetz, Interpretations of the Montana Constitution:
Sometimes Socratic, Sometimes Erratic, 51 MONT. L. REV. 289 (1990). It is peculiarly
idiosyncratic that the judiciary has limited Montana's self-incrimination clause because
of the similarity between its wording and that of the Fifth Amendment yet Montana
simultaneously recognizes that the clauses of the Montana Constitution provide greater
fundamental rights than their federal counterparts.
152. State v. Bullock, 272 Mont. 361, 383, 901 P.2d 61, 75 (1995).
153. Id. at 384, 901 P.2d at 75.
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reviewed in this article, should be utilized by defense counsel,
and perhaps even by prosecutors, to urge a recording
requirement. The requirement should contain the commonsense
limitation that recording is mandated only where such
preservation is practical (i.e. a statement taken at the police
station). Moreover, the recording rule should be applied to the
entire interrogation, including the Miranda waiver, so that the
selective recording that tarnished Cassell does not reoccur.
Unfortunately, the state is keen to exploit technological
advances that impinge our Constitutional rights and freedom,
but, in this instance, resists using technology to safeguard them.
With the almost universal availability of recording technology,
now is the time, as we near the 21st century, to secure a
recording requirement. If litigation fails, legislatures should be
urged to preserve the liberty that our Constitutions command.
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